'Social Media Intoxication' Among Police : MP High Court Says Use Of Mobile/Social Media By Police Guards On Duty Must Be Curbed

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In a police personnel's plea against compulsory retirement given for sleeping under influence while on guard duty, the Madhya Pradesh High Court flagged growing mobile/social media 'intoxication' among the 'uniform clad departments' suggesting that presence of police personnel on social media be checked while they are on duty. 

The bench of Justice Anand Pathak and Justice Pushpendra Yadavobserved; 

"this Court craves attention of Senior Police Officers of Police Department about other Intoxication prevailing in the uniform clad departments like Police, said Intoxication is of Mobile/Social Media. In the present case, where a police constable was posted on Guard Duties at the residence of a Protectee where he was found in dereliction of duties because of consumption of liquor but nowadays it is commonly observed that Guards on Bungalow duties, Court duties, Law and Order duties or duties inter alia where  Police Personnel posted at a place where they have to do sedentary jobs, are involved in observing Mobile and Social Media. This creates indiscipline, casualness in duties and at times incriminating Social Media clips, pollutes the mind and affects disposition of policeman. This issue deserves attention of Senior Police Officers and remedial measures as well". 

The court said that Senior Police Officers may think of incorporating sensitization programmes in police training centres for Constables, Sub Inspectors and other officers and a "mechanism or constant supervision of police personnel and their presence on Social Media can be checked and verified when Police Personnel are on duty". 

"This is the food for thought and Senior Police Officers may discuss and frame a mechanism as per their Rules, Regulations and Guidelines," the court added.

The petitioner, a police employee, was posted on guard duty in Gwalior, but while on duty, he was found sleeping under the influence of alcohol. Thereafter, a department inquiry was initiated, and as a punishment, he was granted compulsory retirement. The petitioner then approached the SAF Deputy Inspector General, but the same was dismissed. The Director General of Police, as well as the writ court, also dismissed the appeals of the petitioner. The petitioner, therefore, approached the High Court.

The counsel for the petitioner claimed that the departmental inquiry was conducted without any medical examination or breath test, and was based merely on a smell test. He contended that the charge of intoxication was deemed proved based on the doctor's opinion. It was asserted that the doctor had found the petitioner fit, despite being in a drunken condition. But the evidence on record was discarded while passing the punishment order. 

The counsel appearing for the respondent claimed that the petitioner, being in the disciplined force and posted on guard duty, was expected to remain 'more vigilant and serious', which he failed to comply with. 

The court, after examining the records, noted that the departmental inquiry was based on the testimony of the doctor, who confirmed that the petitioner's breath contained the fragrance of liquor. 

"An employee that too in police department if performs duties while in influence of liquor or in inebriated condition, is a recipe for law and order problem or dereliction of duty where many things are at stake. Therefore, conduct of police officer/employee is to be seen in that way. If police constable/employee is guilty of such misconduct then it is to be construed seriously," the court said.

Referring to the Supreme Court case of Union of India v K.G. Soni [(2006) 6 SCC 794], the court reiterated that courts could interfere in disciplinary orders if the penalty was illogical, procedurally improper or shockingly disproportionate. Examining the present case, the bench noted that the punishment of compulsory retirement was proportionate to the charges levelled against the petitioner. 

The court further noted that the petitioner had a prior record of indiscipline for remaining absent from duty, for which a penalty was imposed. "Thus, the conduct of petitioner also assumes importance as he appears to be habitual of dereliction of duty", the court added. 

While dismissing the appeal, the court noted, 

"Petitioner was the member of guard duty at the residence of a Protectee, therefore, he was required to be more vigilant for the purpose he was deputed and this intoxication may breed indiscipline and may cause accident/mishap at the hands of guard himself who is meant to protect the person for whose security he is deputed as guard". 

However, the court also drew attention to the emerging issue of police officers using mobile phones and social media while on duty. The court observed;

"Guards on Bungalow duties, Court duties, Law and Order duties or duties inter alia where Police Personnel posted at a place where they have to do sedentary jobs, are involved in observing Mobile and Social Media. This creates indiscipline, casualness in duties and at times incriminating Social Media clips, pollutes the mind and affects disposition of policeman".

Case Title: Ashok Kumar Tripathi v State of MP (WRIT APPEAL 1140 of 2025)

Mother Who Neglected Child and Contracted Second Marriage Disqualified from Custody: Rajasthan High Court

The Rajasthan High Court, in a significant ruling on child custody under Mohammedan Law, has declared a mother’s custody of her minor son illegal, citing her prolonged neglect of the child and her contracting a second marriage while her first marriage was still subsisting. A Division Bench of Justice Manoj Kumar Garg and Justice Ravi Chirania allowed a habeas corpus petition filed by the child’s paternal grandfather, transferring custody to him and holding that the mother’s conduct disqualified her under personal law.

The Court held that while a biological mother typically has the primary right to custody, this right is forfeited when her conduct is serious enough to warrant disqualification under personal law. The paramount consideration, the Court reiterated, is always the welfare of the child.

Background of the Case

The petitioner, Rahisuddin Khan, is the paternal grandfather of the minor child, Jakwan Khan @ Rakan. The child’s father, Rizwan Khan (the petitioner’s son), married the respondent, Smt. Sehra Khan, on December 25, 2006. The minor son was born on November 10, 2012.

According to the petitioner, Sehra Khan left the matrimonial home in 2016, leaving the minor child in his care. Subsequently, on May 21, 2018, she contracted a second marriage with one Mohammed Ujair Ansari in Mumbai without dissolving her first marriage with Rizwan Khan. The petitioner stated he cared for his grandson from 2018 until May 30, 2025, when the mother allegedly kidnapped the child from his lawful custody. This led the grandfather to file an FIR and subsequently the present habeas corpus petition, seeking the child’s return from what he termed the “illegal and wrongful confinement” of the mother.

The High Court first affirmed the maintainability of the habeas corpus petition in child custody matters. Relying on the Supreme Court’s decision in Tejaswini Gaud and Others Vs. Shekhar Jagdish Prasad Tewari And Others, the Bench observed:

“For restoration of the custody of a minor from a person who according to the personal law, is not his legal or natural guardian, in appropriate cases, the writ court has jurisdiction.”

The Court then examined the mother’s conduct, finding it to be a case of serious neglect. The judgment noted, “…she was completely careless in performing her matrimonial obligations without any justified reason and further she seriously neglected her first child whose custody is involved in the present case.” The Court concluded that her actions squarely disqualified her under Section 354(4) of Mulla’s Principles of Mahomedan Law.

The Court expressed “serious doubt about the veracity of ‘khulanama’ dated 03.12.2022” and stated its belief that the mother’s second marriage still subsisted. The Bench strongly deprecated the mother’s conduct before the court, noting that she initially denied the second marriage and only produced the questionable “khulanama” after being confronted with documentary evidence.

“Any litigant or party who approaches the Court with unclean hands deserves no sympathy and leniency. The law in this regard is well settled.”

Ultimately, the decision turned on the paramount consideration of the child’s welfare. After an in-camera interaction with all parties, the Court found the grandfather financially sound and capable of providing a stable and nurturing environment, which he had done for over seven years. In contrast, the mother was financially dependent on her brothers.

Final Directions

The Court allowed the writ petition and declared the mother’s custody of the child to be illegal. The following directions were issued:

1. The mother must immediately hand over the child’s custody to the petitioner-grandfather.
2. The petitioner must continue to provide high-level education and care and create a fixed deposit of Rs. 15 lakh in the child’s name.
3. The child’s father is restrained from taking the child out of India until he turns 18.
4. The mother is granted limited visitation rights on the second Sunday of every alternate month.
5. The mother is restrained from disturbing the peaceful possession of the child with the petitioner.

Sale Deed Executed Without Payment Of Price Is Not Valid; Such Sale Without Consideration Void : Supreme Court

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The Supreme Court reiterated that a sale deed executed without the payment of consideration is not a valid "sale" under Section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 ("TPA"). Such a deed is void and non-use.

Reference was drawn from the case of Kewal Krishnan v. Rajesh Kumar and Others, (2022) 18 SCC 489, where it was also held that the payment of price is an essential part of a sale. If a sale deed in respect of an immovable property is executed without payment of price and if it does not provide for the payment of price at a future date, it is not a sale at all in the eyes of law, the court said in Kewal Krishnan.

"The sale of an immovable property would have to be for a price and such a payment of price is essential, even if it is payable in the future.  If a sale deed is executed without the payment of the price, it is not a sale at all in the eyes of law, specifically, under Section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act. Such a sale without consideration would be void and would not affect the transfer of the immovable property" the Court observed referring to Kewal Krishnan.

A bench of Justice JB Pardiwala and Justice R Mahadevan ruled in favour of the plaintiff who challenged the sale deed executed in the defendant's favor, upon noting that the defendant failed to prove the payment of consideration to the plaintiff, making the sale deed invalid.

It was the case where the sale deed claimed that ₹9,000 had been paid earlier and ₹6,000 was paid to the plaintiff at the time of registration, but the defendant failed to prove these payments. Crucially, the defendant's husband, who allegedly made the final payment, did not testify; one attesting witness had died, and the other was the defendant's brother, whose testimony was found unreliable. The original deed was also not produced, leading to an adverse inference against the defendant.

Since the essential element of payment of sale consideration was not proved, the Court held the sale deed was void ab initio. If the deed is void, there is no need to seek a prayer for its cancellation. Hence, the limitation period for suit to recover possession, when the sale is void, will be governed by Article 65 of the Limitation Act, the Court ruled.

"To put it simply, in the eyes of the law, the plaintiff could not be said to have executed the sale deed. Therefore, the plaintiff could indeed have maintained an action to obtain possession of the property on the basis of her title and filed the same within the period of 12 years from the date of knowledge that the possession of the defendant was adverse to that of the plaintiff," the Court said.

Cause Title: SHANTI DEVI (SINCE DECEASED) THROUGH LRS. GORAN VERSUS JAGAN DEVI & ORS.

Waqf Amendment Act 2025: Supreme Court Stays 5-Year Islam Practice Condition & Provision Derecognizing Waqf Property Till Govt Officers' Decision On Encroachment

 IN RE THE WAQF (AMENDMENT)w ACT, 2025 (1)|W.P.(C) No. 276/2025

The Supreme Court today stayed certain provisions of the Waqf (Amendment) Act 2025.

A bench comprising Chief Justice of India BR Gavai and Justice AG Masih interfered with the following provisions .

1. The provision in Section 3(1)(r) that a person should be a practitioner of Islam for 5 years to create a Waqf has been stayed till State Governments frame rules for providing mechanism to determine the question whether a person has been practising Islam for 5 years or more. Without such a mechanism, the privison will lead to an "arbitrary exercise of power," the Court observed.

2. The proviso to sub-section 2 of Section 3C, allowing the designated officer of the Government to decide the dispute whether a Waqf property has encroached upon a Government property has been stayed, observing that an Executive Officer cannot be permitted to adjudicate the rights of personal citizens and this will violate the separation of powers. However, till adjudication happens by the Tribunal, no third party rights can be created against any parties.

3. The provision allowing the nomination of non-Muslim members to the Waqf Boards has not been stayed. However, the Court observed that, as far as possible, the Ex-officio member of the Board, should be a Muslim person. The Court observed that for the Central Waqf Councul, it shall not consist of more than 4 non-muslim members, and for State Waqf Board, not more than 3 non-Muslim members.

The Court did not interfere with the provision mandating registration, saying that it is not a new requirement, as this condition was there in the previous enactments of 1995 and 2013 as well. However, the Court has extended the timelines for registration (which will be known once the judgment is uploaded.)

The Court had reserved the order on May 22 after hearing the parties over three days. The petitions are filed challenging the constitutionality of the sweeping changes made to the Waqf law by the amendments passed by the Parliament in 2025.

In April, after a bench led by former CJI Sanjiv Khanna expressed some prima facie reservations about some of the provisions, the Union undertook that non-Muslims would not be appointed to the State Waqf Boards and the Central Waqf Councils during the pendency of the matter. The Centre also agreed that no Waqf, including a Waqf by user, whether declared by way of notification or by way of registration, shall be de-notified, nor will their character or status be changed.

AIMIM MP Asaduddin Owaisi, Delhi AAP MLA Amanatullah Khan, Association for Protection of Civil Rights, Jamiat Ulema-i-Hind President Arshad Madani,Samastha Kerala Jamiatul Ulema, Anjum Kadari, Taiyyab Khan Salmani, Mohammad Shafi, TMC MP Mahua Moitra, Indian Union Muslim League, All India Muslim Personal Law Board, RJD MP Manoj Kumar Jha, SP MP Zia ur Rehman, Communist Party of India, DMK etc., are some of the petitioners.

Intervention applications have been filed by five BJP-led States: Assam, Rajasthan, Chhattisgarh, Uttarakhand, Haryana and Maharashtra, supporting the legislation. Recently, the State of Kerala has also filed an intervention supporting the 2025 Amendment.

Common provisions challenged in all petitions

Omission of 'waqf by user' provision, inclusion of non-Muslim members in the Central Waqf Council and State Waqf Board, pre-condition of 5 years as practising Muslim for create of waqf, allowing Government to decide disputes regarding encroachment of government property, application of Limitation Act to Waqf Act, invalidating Waqf created over ASI protected monuments, restrictions on creating Waqfs over scheduled areas, limiting the inclusion of women members to two in the Council and Boards, diluting waqf-alal-aulad, renaming 'Waqf Act, 1995 to "Unifed Waqf Management, Empowerment, Efficiency and Development," providing appeal against the Tribunal's order etc., are some of the provisons under challenge.

Written Agreement Not Essential For Divorce By 'Mubaraat', Mutual Verbal Consent Of Muslim Couple Sufficient: Gujarat High Court

The Gujarat High Court has ruled that under Muslim law, when a couple mutually decides to dissolve their marriage i.e. Mubaraat, they are at liberty to do so through mutual verbal consent without drawing up a written agreement. For context, under Muslim law process of Mubaraat refers to divorce/dissolution of marriage through mutual consent between the husband and wife.

'When Road Is In Bad Condition, How Toll Can Be Collected?': Supreme Court Asks NHAI Over Toll Collection At Paliyekkara In NH 544

The Supreme Court on Thursday (August 14) expressed reluctance to entertain the petition filed by the National Highways Authority of India (NHAI) challenging thejudgment of the Kerala High Court which suspended the toll collection at the Paliyekkara toll plaza in Thrissur district along National Highway 544 due to the bad condition of the highway. 

Both Chief Justice of India BR Gavai and Justice K Vinod Chandran, the members of the two-judge bench, said that they have personally experienced the bad condition of the road stretch.

Solicitor General of India Tushar Mehta said that the NHAI was primarily aggrieved with the High Court stating that the concessionaire can recover from the NHAI the losses it suffered due to the suspension of the toll collection. "My worry is they(concessionaire) will claim from me(NHAI), though it is their responsibility[to maintain the road]," SG said.

CJI Gavai said, "When the road is in such a bad condition... I had occasion to travel in it. You take the toll from the people and don't provide the services..."

"The service road is not being maintained. It is not the concessionaire's responsibility. That is the finding of the High Court"Justice Chandran said. SG replied that, as per the O&M contract, the liability is on the concessionaire. 

The counsel for the concessionaire said that there were five blind spots identified by the authorities, which do not come within their scope of work. "I am maintaining the Highway as per the agreement," the counsel said.

SG pointed out that the concessionaire has also filed a Special Leave Petition which is not listed today. "We will dismiss both," CJI said. When the SG requested for a posting to Monday, CJI asked, "You want to postpone the dismissal?"

"We will clarify that if there is any dispute between the NHAI and the concessionaire, it be determined as per the law, whether arbitration or otherwise," CJI said.

In an attempt to persuade the bench, the SG explained :. 

"There is a 65 kilometre road. The dispute is with respect to 2.85 kilometers. This a highway constructed by NHAI. There are intersections which are blind spots, where we have to make either underpasses or flyovers."

"You had to do it at the planning stage itself. Before completing the road, you start collecting the toll?" CJI remarked. SG said that the intersections came subsequent to the highway.

Justice Vinod Chandran however pointed out that the intersections specified by the NHAI, such as Muningoor, Amballoor, Perambra, Koratty, Chirangara etc., are quite far from the toll booth. Justice Chandran also referred to a Malayalam news report about the protest staged by a person after he could not attend his father-in-law's funeral due to the traffic block at the toll booth.

"The entire problem occurs because there is a big block there. There is a bottleneck. Often, even ambulances cannot pass. That is the problem. The High Court has only suspended for four weeks. Instead of filing appeal and wasting time, you do something," Justice Vinod Chandran said. SG assured that the work was under progress.

"Without completing the road, how can you start the toll? I also had the opportunity to travel by that road once," CJI Gavai said. "My learned brother also knows the area very well," CJI added. 

SG said that the highway was constructed long back and the five intersections came subsequently. "There is no difficulty with the highway. The difficulty is with the intersections. To resolve the blindspots, we are constructing overbridges and underpasses at the intersections, which came subsequent to the Highway. For that purpose, we have constructed the service road. Because when work is going on, the highway cannot be used and service road has to be used. The congestion is in the service road. That is the issue," SG stated.

"The congestion in the blindspots in the intersection are quite distant from the toll area. They are obliged to do maintenance only with respect to the toll area. Not with respect to the service road," Justice Chandran said. SG then requested a posting on Monday to show the locations of work from the map.

The bench said that it was not prima facie inclined to entertain the challenge. The bench said that it will clarify that the inter-se dispute between the NHAI and the concessionaire can be resolved through arbitration. "We will leave issue open to be decided in arbitration between NHAI and the concessionaire. Arbitrators will be benefited, the lawyers will be benefited. Why should the citizens be put to unnecessary hardships?" CJI said.

CJI pointed out that the High Court has been prodding the authorities to resolve the issue since February and that the judgment was passed after there was no positive response.

Senior Advocate Shyam Divan, for the concessionaire Guruvayoor Infrastructure Ltd, said that they have also filed a petition challenging the High Court's judgment and requested that it be posted on Monday.  The matter was ultimately posted to Monday.

Senior Advocate Jayant Muthuraj represented the petitioners who were in the High Court.

By the judgment dated August 6, a division bench of the Kerala High Court ordered the suspension of toll collection for four weeks on the ground that the Edapally-Mannuthy stretch was badly maintained and was facing severe traffic congestion due to the delay in the execution of works.

The Court observed that toll fees cannot be collected from the public when access to highway is hindered due to ill-maintained roads and consequent traffic congestion.

"It is to be remembered that the public is obliged to pay the user fees at the toll for using the highway. It casts responsibility on the National Highways Authority to ensure smooth traffic without any barrier created by the NHAI or by its agents, who are the concessionaires. This relationship between the Public and the NHAI is bound by the tie of public trust. The moment it is breached or violated, the right to collect toll fees from the public created through statutory provisions cannot be forced on the public," the High Court observed.

Case Details : NATIONAL HIGHWAY AUTHORITY OF INDIA AND ANR. Versus O.J JANEESH AND ORS| SLP(C) No. 22579/2025

The Supreme Court held that the filing of an incomplete chargesheet will not defeat the right of the accused to seek default bail.

The Supreme Court

has dismissed the review petition filed by the Central Bureau of Investigation against the 2023 judgment in the case  Ritu Chhabaria v. Union of India And Ors which held that the filing of an incomplete chargesheet will not defeat the right of the accused to seek default bail.

A bench comprising Chief Justice of India BR Gavai and Justice MM Sundresh dismissed the review petition in chamber observing, "we do not find any justifiable reason to entertain the review petition."

The Ritu Chhabaria judgment was delivered on April 26, 2023, by a bench comprising Justice Krishna Murari and Justice CT Ravikumar (both of them retired now) holding that "if the Investigating Agency files a chargesheet without completing the investigation, the same would not extinguish the right of the accused to get default bail."

It may be noted that the operation of the Ritu Chhabaria judgment has been in effect suspended by virtue of another order passed by the Supreme Court in a Special Leave Petition filed by the Enforcement Directorate (SLP(Crl) No. 005724 - / 2023). On May 1, 2023, a bench comprising the then Chief Justice of India DY Chandrachud and Justice Pardiwala ordered that applications seeking default bail on the basis of the Ritu Chhabaria judgment should be deferred by the Court. This order was passed after Solicitor General of India Tushar Mehta submitted that the investigating agencies are facing difficulties due to the judgment. The said SLP of the ED is still pending, which means that the operation of the Ritu Chhabaria judgment continues to be in abeyance, despite the dismissal of the review petition.

Case : CENTRAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION THROUGH SUPERINTENDENT v. RITU CHHABARIA & ORS | R.P. (CRL.) NO. 124/2025 IN W.P. (CRL.) NO. 60/2023

SC Slams Allahabad HC Judge Over Shocking Observations in Criminal Case, Orders Immediate Withdrawal of Criminal Jurisdiction

37528/2025 (M/S. SHIKHAR CHEMICALS vs. THE STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH)

In a strong rebuke to the functioning of a sitting judge of the Allahabad High Court, the Supreme Court of India on Monday made scathing remarks while hearing a Special Leave Petition (SLP) challenging an order that allowed the continuation of criminal proceedings in a matter the apex court found to be clearly civil in nature.

The SLP was filed against the judgment dated May 5, 2025, in Application U/S 482 No. 2507 of 2024, in which the High Court had permitted the complainant to proceed with criminal litigation despite acknowledging that the underlying dispute involved financial recovery—a domain typically handled through civil proceedings.

A Bench comprising Justice J.B. Pardiwala and Justice R. Mahadevan, while hearing the matter in open court, set aside the Allahabad High Court’s decision and issued a damning critique of the reasoning adopted by the concerned judge.

High Court’s Observations Deemed “Shocking” by Apex Court

The Supreme Court expressed grave concern over Paragraph 12 of the impugned High Court judgment, where the judge had reasoned that referring the complainant to a civil court for recovery would be unfair, as it would require additional financial investment and prolonged litigation. The High Court judge had remarked:

“In case, O.P. no.2 files a civil suit, firstly, it will take years for it to see any ray of hope and secondly, he will have to put more money to pursue the litigation. To be more precise, it would seem like good money chasing bad money… If this Court allows the matter to be referred to civil court… it would amount to travesty of justice.”

The apex court took serious exception to this line of reasoning. Justice Pardiwala observed:

“The judge has gone to the extent of saying that asking the complainant to pursue civil remedy for the purpose of recovery of his balance amount will be very unreasonable… Is it the understanding of the High Court judge that even ultimately, rightly or wrongly, if the accused is convicted, the trial court will award him the balance amount? The findings recorded in para 12 are shocking.”

The Supreme Court passed the following Order in Open Court:

“The judge has gone to the extent of saying that asking the complainant to pursue civil remedy for the purpose of recovery of his balance amount will be very unreasonable as civil suit may take a long time before it is decided and therefore, the complainant should be permitted to institute criminal proceedings for the purpose of recovery of the balance amount. Is it the understanding of the High Court judge that even ultimately rightly or wrongly if the accused is convicted, the trial court will award him the balance amount?

The findings recorded in para 12 are shocking. We are left with no other option but to set aside this order even without issuing notice to the respondents.

In the result, we partly allow this petition and set aside the impugned order passed by the High Court. We remand the matter to the High Court for fresh consideration of the Criminal Miscellaneous Application Number 2507 of 2024.

We request the Honourable Chief Justice of the High Court to assign this matter to any other judge of the High Court. We further request the Honourable Chief Justice to immediately withdraw the present determination of the concerned judge.

The concerned judge should be made to sit in a division bench with a senior, with a, with a seasoned senior judge of the High Court. In any view of the matter, the concerned judge shall not be assigned any criminal determination till he demits office. If at all at some point of time he is to be made to sit as a single judge, he shall not be assigned any criminal determination. Registry to forward one copy of this order to Honourable the Chief Justice of Allahabad High Court at the earliest.”

Supreme Court Sets Aside Order, Reprimands Judicial Conduct

Finding the observations untenable in law and jurisprudentially flawed, the Supreme Court declared that it had no choice but to set aside the High Court order “even without issuing notice to the respondents.”

The bench directed that the matter be reconsidered afresh and passed the following operative directions:

• The petition was partly allowed, and the impugned order dated May 5, 2025, was set aside.
  
• The matter was remanded to the High Court for fresh adjudication in Application U/S 482 No. 2507 of 2024.
  
• The Supreme Court requested the Chief Justice of the Allahabad High Court to assign the case to a different judge.
  
• Furthermore, the top court directed that the concerned judge should be immediately divested of any criminal jurisdiction.
  
• If required to sit singly in the future, no criminal cases should be assigned to the judge.
  
• The judge should only sit as part of a Division Bench with a seasoned senior judge until demitting office.
  
• The Registry was directed to send a copy of the order to the Chief Justice of the Allahabad High Court without delay.

In compliance with the Order of the Supreme Court, the Allahabad High Court has issued a supplementary roster, wherein the jurisdiction of the Judge has been changed and has been assigned in a Division Bench.

Section 138 NI Act-Conviction Must Be Followed by Fine Covering Cheque Amount, Interest, and Compensation: Supreme Court

The Supreme Court has held that in cases of conviction under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, the sentencing must be accompanied by a fine sufficient to cover the cheque amount, along with applicable interest and compensation. A bench of Justice B.V. Nagarathna and Justice K.V. Viswanathan dismissed the appeal filed by the accused, Mohammad Ali, and upheld his conviction by the Karnataka High Court.

Case Background

Mohammad Ali was prosecuted by Sharanappa in Criminal Case No. 2378 of 2013 before the I Additional Civil Judge and JMFC, Vijayapur, for dishonour of a cheque worth ₹10,00,000. The trial court acquitted the accused on January 6, 2017. This acquittal was challenged by the complainant before the High Court of Karnataka at Kalaburagi Bench.

On October 9, 2023, the High Court allowed the appeal and convicted Mohammad Ali under Section 138 of the NI Act. It imposed a fine of ₹10,10,000, of which ₹10,00,000 was directed to be paid to the complainant as compensation under Section 357(1)(b) of the CrPC, and ₹10,000 was to be remitted to the State. In case of default, the accused was ordered to undergo simple imprisonment for six months.

The bench rejected both grounds raised by the appellant.

On the first issue, the Court observed:

“Even in the absence of any rebuttal evidence, the appellant cannot contend that there was an absence of foundational facts or that the very raising of a presumption under Section 118 read with Section 139 of the Act in favour of the respondent was incorrect.”

The Court held that the complainant had successfully established foundational facts, and in the absence of rebuttal evidence from the accused, the High Court was justified in raising the statutory presumptions and convicting him.

On the second issue regarding compensation, the Court referred to its earlier judgment in R. Vijayan v. Baby, (2012) 1 SCC 260, and noted:

“Section 138 of the Act authorises the learned Magistrate to impose by way of fine an amount which may extend to twice the amount of cheque, with or without imprisonment. In all such cases, where there is a conviction, there should be a consequential levy of fine of an amount sufficient to cover the cheque amount. There could also be interest on the cheque amount, followed by award of such amount as compensation from the fine amount.”

The Court clarified that the High Court had imposed a fine of ₹10,10,000, from which ₹10,00,000 was to be paid to the complainant as compensation. The additional ₹10,000 was to be remitted to the State. There was no separate or additional award of compensation beyond the fine.

“We do not think that the appellant has been directed to pay a fine of ₹10,10,000 and an additional amount of ₹10,00,000 towards compensation. Thus, in fact, the respondent has not been paid any amount by way of compensation at all. He is ordered to be entitled to cheque amount of ₹10,00,000 and no further amount.”

Order

The Supreme Court refused to interfere with the conviction or the sentence. However, upon request by the appellant’s counsel, the Court granted three months’ time from the date of judgment to deposit the fine amount. The cheque amount was to be paid to the complainant upon deposit, failing which the appellant would serve the default sentence of six months’ simple imprisonment.

The appeal was disposed of accordingly.

Husband's Friend Is Not His Relative, Can't Be Booked U/S 498A IPC: Bombay High Court

NMM vs State of Maharashtra (Criminal Application 1619 of1923

A male friend of the husband is not his relative and thus cannot be booked under section 498A of the Indian Penal Code (IPC), held the Nagpur bench of the Bombay High Court recently, while quashing a First Information Report (FIR) lodged against a man booked under the said offence. 

A division of Justices Anil Pansare and Mahendra Nerlikar noted that one of the applicants before it was the husband's friend, who was named by the complainant wife in her FIR against her husband and his parents. 

The judges referred to the ruling of the Supreme Court in which the top court had held that a girlfriend or even a woman with whom a man has had romantic or sexual relations outside of marriage court not be construed to be a relative. The judges noted that the word 'relative' brings within its purview a 'status' which is conferred either by “blood or marriage or adoption.”

"Therefore, we have no hesitation in observing that the same analogy would be applied while interpreting the term 'relative' defined under Section 498-A of the IPC in respect of a 'friend.' A friend cannot be said to be a relative as he is neither a blood relative nor he was having any relation through marriage or adoption. Therefore, considering these facts and upon plain reading of Section 498-A of the IPC, we come to the conclusion that a friend of husband will not fall under the definition of 'relative' of the husband as contemplated under Section 498-A of the IPC," the judges held in the order passed on July 29. 

According to the FIR filed by the woman on June 13, 2022, the friend of her husband often visited their matrimonial house and instigated the husband to demand a car and a plot from the wife's parents. The friend was further accused of insisting the husband not to cohabit with the complainant wife on her failure to fulfil the demand. The friend was also accused of instigating the husband to drive the wife out of her matrimonial house for failing to meet the demands. 

However, the bench noted that since the applicant is a friend and does not qualify the status of a 'relative' of the husband, he cannot be made to face trial under section 498A and therefore, quashed the FIR and also the chargesheet filed against him by the Chandrapur Police.

Offence U/s. 138 NI Act Should Be Tried By Court Where Cheque Is Delivered For Collection Through Branch Of Payee's Bank: Supreme Court

The Supreme Court was considering an SLP against an order of the High Court affirming the order of the Magistrate Court returning the Complaint for lack of jurisdiction.;

The Supreme Court has reiterated that an offence under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act can be inquired into and tried only by a local Court in jurisdiction of which the cheque is delivered for collection through an account in the Branch of the Bank where the payee maintains that account.

The Court was considering a Petition for Special Leave to Appeal against an order of the High Court affirming the Magistrate Court's order returning cases registered for cheque dishonour on the grounds of lack of jurisdiction to entertain the complaint cases.

The Bench of Justice Sanjay Kumar and Justice Satish Chandra Sharma held, "As regards territorial jurisdiction for instituting a complaint in relation to dishonor of a cheque, Section 142(2)(a) of the N.I. Act makes it clear that an offence under Section 138 thereof should be inquired into and tried only by a Court within whose local jurisdiction, if the cheque is delivered for collection through an account, the branch of the bank where the payee maintains the account is situated. This provision, as it stands after its amendment in 2015...."

Facts of the Case

The Appellant’s case was that the husband of the Respondent borrowed a sum of Rs.38,50,000/- from him and she stood as a guarantor for the repayment of the loan. She also availed financial assistance from the Appellant and four cheques came to be issued by her during September, 2023, in discharge of her husband’s liability and her own liability. These cheques were deposited by the Appellant at Kotak Mahindra Bank, Opera House Branch, Mumbai. However, they were dishonored due to insufficiency of funds, as was intimated to the Appellant. Thereupon, he filed four complaint cases under Section 200 Cr.P.C. read with Section 138 of the N.I. Act before the Judicial Magistrate First Class. However, the Magistrate returned the complaint cases for presentation before the jurisdictional Court, stating that the drawee bank was Kotak Mahindra Bank at Mumbai and, therefore, his Court had no territorial jurisdiction to entertain the complaint cases. Later, the High Court confirmed the order in Appeal.

Senior Counsel for the Appellant asserted that the Appellant maintains his bank account with the Kotak Mahindra Bank at its Bendurwell, Mangalore Branch, and that he had merely presented the cheques issued by the Respondent at the Bank’s Branch at Opera House, Mumbai, to be credited to the said account. He contended that the High Court proceeded on the erroneous assumption that the Appellant maintained his bank account at the Opera House Branch of Kotak Mahindra Bank in Mumbai and on the strength of this wrong premise, the High Court confirmed the order of the Magistrate, returning the complaint cases on the ground of territorial jurisdiction.

Reasoning By Court

The Court at the outset observed that it is not in dispute that the Appellant maintains his bank account with the Bendurwell, Mangalore Branch, of the Kotak Mahindra Bank and merely deposited the Respondent’s cheques at its Mumbai Branch for the purpose of crediting his account in Mangalore.

It asserted that an offence under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instrument Act can be inquired into and tried only by a local Court in jurisdiction of which the cheque is delivered for collection, that is, through an account in the Branch of the Bank where the payee maintains that account. The same was affirmed in Supreme Court's decision in Bridgestone India Private Limited vs. Inderpal Singh.

"Therefore, once it is established that, at the time of presentation of the cheques in question, the appellant maintained his account with the Kotak Mahindra Bank at its Bendurwell, Mangalore Branch, he was fully justified in filing his complaint cases before the jurisdictional Court at Mangalore. The understanding to the contrary of the learned Magistrate at Mangalore was erroneous and completely opposed to the clear mandate of Section 142(2)(a) of the N.I. Act. The High Court proceeded to confirm the erroneous order passed by the learned Magistrate under the wrong impression that the appellant maintained his bank account at the Opera House Branch of the Kotak Mahindra Bank at Mumbai," the Court held.

The Appeals were accordingly allowed.

Cause Title: Prakash Chimanlal Sheth vs. Jagruti Keyur Rajpopat

Supreme Court: Magistrate Can Direct Registration Of FIR U/s. 156(3) CrPC Even If Informant Has Not Exhausted Remedies

The Supreme Court was considering Special Leave Petitions challenging the judgment whereby the petitions seeking quashing of the order of the Metropolitan Magistrate as well as the criminal proceedings were dismissed.;

The Supreme Court has held that a Magistrate is competent under Section 156(3) CrPC to direct the registration of an FIR if the allegations in the application/complaint disclose the commission of a cognizable offence, even if the informant has not exhausted the remedies provided under the said provision.  The Court also held that ignoring the remedy under Section 154(3) of the CrPC amounts to a mere procedural irregularity.

The Apex Court was considering Special Leave Petitions challenging the judgment whereby the petitions seeking quashing of the order of the Metropolitan Magistrate, New Delhi, as well as the criminal proceedings, were dismissed.

The Division Bench comprising Justice Pankaj Mithal and Justice S.V.N. Bhatti held, “To sum up, the Magistrate ought not to ordinarily entertain an application under Section 156(3) CrPC directly unless the informant has availed and exhausted his remedies provided under Section 154(3) CrPC, but as the Magistrate is otherwise competent under Section 156(3) CrPC to direct the registration of an FIR if the allegations in the application/complaint discloses the commission of a cognizable offence, we are of the opinion that the order so passed by the Magistrate would not be without jurisdiction and would not stand vitiated on this count.”

“Therefore, if an FIR has not been registered for any reason at the police station and the Magistrate is satisfied that the information discloses a cognizable offence, he can certainly direct for its registration obviously on compliance of the provisions of Section 154(3) of the CrPC. This is exactly what has been done by the Magistrate by way of his order dated 01.07.2005 though ignoring the remedy under Section 154(3) of the CrPC which, as said earlier, amounts to mere procedural irregularity”, it added.

Senior Advocate Ranjit Kumar represented the Petitioners, while Senior Advocate Jayant Bhushanrepresented the Respondents.

Factual Background

The complainant, M/s Sunair Hotels Limited, was allotted land at Bangla Sahib Road, New Delhi, for the construction and operation of a hotel. A non-banking finance company, VLS Finance Limited, through its directors and senior officers (accused persons), approached SHL with the desire to join the project as financial consultants. Accordingly, SHL entered into a Memorandum of Understanding but later discovered that the promise of VLS to issue shares at a premium of Rs 100 per share was legally not possible due to the guidelines of the Securities and Exchange Board of India. SHL initiated arbitration proceedings against VLS, alleging that it had not kept its promises. An award was passed, but the same is a subject matter of challenge before the Delhi High Court.

Some time in the year 2000, VLS discovered fraudulent conduct on the part of SHL and filed a complaint. It was alleged that in retaliation for the aforesaid complaints, SHL filed a complaint against the officials of the VLS. An FIR came to be registered under Sections 406, 409, 420, 424 and 122-B IPC on the ground that VLS failed to bring out the public issue of SHL as agreed and VLS played fraud upon SHL. The quashing petitions filed by VLS and its officers were dismissed by the High Court. It was in such circumstances that the SLPs came to be filed before the Apex Court.

Reasoning

On a perusal of the facts of the case, the Bench noted that an application was filed under Section 156(3) of the CrPC wherein the informant had simply stated that an offence under Sections 420, 120-B and 34 of the IPC was committed and that the informant had approached the “police officials” several times but in vain. The application nowhere stated that the informant had ever approached the officer-in-charge of the police station for lodging the FIR following Section 154 of the CrPC or that on refusal to record such information, he had availed the remedy of approaching the Superintendent of Police concerned.

In this case, the informant had neither approached the officer-in-charge of the police station or the Superintendent of Police concerned as contemplated under Sections 154(1) and 154(3) of the CrPC but had directly gone to the Magistrate under Section 156(3) of the CrPC. On this aspect, the Bench said, “In the facts and circumstances of the case, as the informant had directly moved the Magistrate under Section 156(3) of the CrPC without exhausting his statutory remedies, the Magistrate could have avoided taking action on the said application and could have refused to direct for the registration of the FIR. However, as entertaining an application directly by the Magistrate is a mere procedural irregularity and since the Magistrate in a given circumstance is otherwise empowered to pass such an order, the action of the Magistrate may not be illegal or without jurisdiction.”

The Bench found that the Magistrate had not only heard the counsel and perused the documents but had even considered the case law cited and had opined that the information disclosed a cognizable offence. This implied that he had applied his mind to the contents of the application before passing the impugned order directing for the registration of the FIR. Therefore, the Bench found no fault with the order of the High Court in refusing to quash the order of the Magistrate.

It was also stated by the Bench that the High Court had rightly refused to exercise its discretionary jurisdiction so as to interfere with the FIR, as the investigations had been completed and the chargesheets had been filed. On the issue of maintainability of successive FIRs in respect of same cognizable offence, the Bench noted, “ Therefore, agreeing with the view that there can be no second FIR and no fresh investigation on receipt of the subsequent information but as on the basis of the earlier first information, there is no conviction and acquittal, it cannot be said that a second complaint/FIR is not maintainable.”Noting that the allegations were different and even the parties against whom the FIRs were filed were not the same, the Bench refrained from making any final comment on the aspect of maintainability of FIR, as no such finding on this aspect had been returned by the court below.

Thus, noting that the investigations had been completed and the High Court had refused to quash the said FIR in exercise of its discretionary power, the Bench dismissed the petitions and left the matter to proceed further in accordance with law.

Cause Title: Anurag Bhatnagar & Anr. v. State (Nct of Delhi) & Anr. (Neutral Citation: 2025 INSC 895)