'Social Media Intoxication' Among Police : MP High Court Says Use Of Mobile/Social Media By Police Guards On Duty Must Be Curbed

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In a police personnel's plea against compulsory retirement given for sleeping under influence while on guard duty, the Madhya Pradesh High Court flagged growing mobile/social media 'intoxication' among the 'uniform clad departments' suggesting that presence of police personnel on social media be checked while they are on duty. 

The bench of Justice Anand Pathak and Justice Pushpendra Yadavobserved; 

"this Court craves attention of Senior Police Officers of Police Department about other Intoxication prevailing in the uniform clad departments like Police, said Intoxication is of Mobile/Social Media. In the present case, where a police constable was posted on Guard Duties at the residence of a Protectee where he was found in dereliction of duties because of consumption of liquor but nowadays it is commonly observed that Guards on Bungalow duties, Court duties, Law and Order duties or duties inter alia where  Police Personnel posted at a place where they have to do sedentary jobs, are involved in observing Mobile and Social Media. This creates indiscipline, casualness in duties and at times incriminating Social Media clips, pollutes the mind and affects disposition of policeman. This issue deserves attention of Senior Police Officers and remedial measures as well". 

The court said that Senior Police Officers may think of incorporating sensitization programmes in police training centres for Constables, Sub Inspectors and other officers and a "mechanism or constant supervision of police personnel and their presence on Social Media can be checked and verified when Police Personnel are on duty". 

"This is the food for thought and Senior Police Officers may discuss and frame a mechanism as per their Rules, Regulations and Guidelines," the court added.

The petitioner, a police employee, was posted on guard duty in Gwalior, but while on duty, he was found sleeping under the influence of alcohol. Thereafter, a department inquiry was initiated, and as a punishment, he was granted compulsory retirement. The petitioner then approached the SAF Deputy Inspector General, but the same was dismissed. The Director General of Police, as well as the writ court, also dismissed the appeals of the petitioner. The petitioner, therefore, approached the High Court.

The counsel for the petitioner claimed that the departmental inquiry was conducted without any medical examination or breath test, and was based merely on a smell test. He contended that the charge of intoxication was deemed proved based on the doctor's opinion. It was asserted that the doctor had found the petitioner fit, despite being in a drunken condition. But the evidence on record was discarded while passing the punishment order. 

The counsel appearing for the respondent claimed that the petitioner, being in the disciplined force and posted on guard duty, was expected to remain 'more vigilant and serious', which he failed to comply with. 

The court, after examining the records, noted that the departmental inquiry was based on the testimony of the doctor, who confirmed that the petitioner's breath contained the fragrance of liquor. 

"An employee that too in police department if performs duties while in influence of liquor or in inebriated condition, is a recipe for law and order problem or dereliction of duty where many things are at stake. Therefore, conduct of police officer/employee is to be seen in that way. If police constable/employee is guilty of such misconduct then it is to be construed seriously," the court said.

Referring to the Supreme Court case of Union of India v K.G. Soni [(2006) 6 SCC 794], the court reiterated that courts could interfere in disciplinary orders if the penalty was illogical, procedurally improper or shockingly disproportionate. Examining the present case, the bench noted that the punishment of compulsory retirement was proportionate to the charges levelled against the petitioner. 

The court further noted that the petitioner had a prior record of indiscipline for remaining absent from duty, for which a penalty was imposed. "Thus, the conduct of petitioner also assumes importance as he appears to be habitual of dereliction of duty", the court added. 

While dismissing the appeal, the court noted, 

"Petitioner was the member of guard duty at the residence of a Protectee, therefore, he was required to be more vigilant for the purpose he was deputed and this intoxication may breed indiscipline and may cause accident/mishap at the hands of guard himself who is meant to protect the person for whose security he is deputed as guard". 

However, the court also drew attention to the emerging issue of police officers using mobile phones and social media while on duty. The court observed;

"Guards on Bungalow duties, Court duties, Law and Order duties or duties inter alia where Police Personnel posted at a place where they have to do sedentary jobs, are involved in observing Mobile and Social Media. This creates indiscipline, casualness in duties and at times incriminating Social Media clips, pollutes the mind and affects disposition of policeman".

Case Title: Ashok Kumar Tripathi v State of MP (WRIT APPEAL 1140 of 2025)

Mother Who Neglected Child and Contracted Second Marriage Disqualified from Custody: Rajasthan High Court

The Rajasthan High Court, in a significant ruling on child custody under Mohammedan Law, has declared a mother’s custody of her minor son illegal, citing her prolonged neglect of the child and her contracting a second marriage while her first marriage was still subsisting. A Division Bench of Justice Manoj Kumar Garg and Justice Ravi Chirania allowed a habeas corpus petition filed by the child’s paternal grandfather, transferring custody to him and holding that the mother’s conduct disqualified her under personal law.

The Court held that while a biological mother typically has the primary right to custody, this right is forfeited when her conduct is serious enough to warrant disqualification under personal law. The paramount consideration, the Court reiterated, is always the welfare of the child.

Background of the Case

The petitioner, Rahisuddin Khan, is the paternal grandfather of the minor child, Jakwan Khan @ Rakan. The child’s father, Rizwan Khan (the petitioner’s son), married the respondent, Smt. Sehra Khan, on December 25, 2006. The minor son was born on November 10, 2012.

According to the petitioner, Sehra Khan left the matrimonial home in 2016, leaving the minor child in his care. Subsequently, on May 21, 2018, she contracted a second marriage with one Mohammed Ujair Ansari in Mumbai without dissolving her first marriage with Rizwan Khan. The petitioner stated he cared for his grandson from 2018 until May 30, 2025, when the mother allegedly kidnapped the child from his lawful custody. This led the grandfather to file an FIR and subsequently the present habeas corpus petition, seeking the child’s return from what he termed the “illegal and wrongful confinement” of the mother.

The High Court first affirmed the maintainability of the habeas corpus petition in child custody matters. Relying on the Supreme Court’s decision in Tejaswini Gaud and Others Vs. Shekhar Jagdish Prasad Tewari And Others, the Bench observed:

“For restoration of the custody of a minor from a person who according to the personal law, is not his legal or natural guardian, in appropriate cases, the writ court has jurisdiction.”

The Court then examined the mother’s conduct, finding it to be a case of serious neglect. The judgment noted, “…she was completely careless in performing her matrimonial obligations without any justified reason and further she seriously neglected her first child whose custody is involved in the present case.” The Court concluded that her actions squarely disqualified her under Section 354(4) of Mulla’s Principles of Mahomedan Law.

The Court expressed “serious doubt about the veracity of ‘khulanama’ dated 03.12.2022” and stated its belief that the mother’s second marriage still subsisted. The Bench strongly deprecated the mother’s conduct before the court, noting that she initially denied the second marriage and only produced the questionable “khulanama” after being confronted with documentary evidence.

“Any litigant or party who approaches the Court with unclean hands deserves no sympathy and leniency. The law in this regard is well settled.”

Ultimately, the decision turned on the paramount consideration of the child’s welfare. After an in-camera interaction with all parties, the Court found the grandfather financially sound and capable of providing a stable and nurturing environment, which he had done for over seven years. In contrast, the mother was financially dependent on her brothers.

Final Directions

The Court allowed the writ petition and declared the mother’s custody of the child to be illegal. The following directions were issued:

1. The mother must immediately hand over the child’s custody to the petitioner-grandfather.
2. The petitioner must continue to provide high-level education and care and create a fixed deposit of Rs. 15 lakh in the child’s name.
3. The child’s father is restrained from taking the child out of India until he turns 18.
4. The mother is granted limited visitation rights on the second Sunday of every alternate month.
5. The mother is restrained from disturbing the peaceful possession of the child with the petitioner.

Sale Deed Executed Without Payment Of Price Is Not Valid; Such Sale Without Consideration Void : Supreme Court

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The Supreme Court reiterated that a sale deed executed without the payment of consideration is not a valid "sale" under Section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 ("TPA"). Such a deed is void and non-use.

Reference was drawn from the case of Kewal Krishnan v. Rajesh Kumar and Others, (2022) 18 SCC 489, where it was also held that the payment of price is an essential part of a sale. If a sale deed in respect of an immovable property is executed without payment of price and if it does not provide for the payment of price at a future date, it is not a sale at all in the eyes of law, the court said in Kewal Krishnan.

"The sale of an immovable property would have to be for a price and such a payment of price is essential, even if it is payable in the future.  If a sale deed is executed without the payment of the price, it is not a sale at all in the eyes of law, specifically, under Section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act. Such a sale without consideration would be void and would not affect the transfer of the immovable property" the Court observed referring to Kewal Krishnan.

A bench of Justice JB Pardiwala and Justice R Mahadevan ruled in favour of the plaintiff who challenged the sale deed executed in the defendant's favor, upon noting that the defendant failed to prove the payment of consideration to the plaintiff, making the sale deed invalid.

It was the case where the sale deed claimed that ₹9,000 had been paid earlier and ₹6,000 was paid to the plaintiff at the time of registration, but the defendant failed to prove these payments. Crucially, the defendant's husband, who allegedly made the final payment, did not testify; one attesting witness had died, and the other was the defendant's brother, whose testimony was found unreliable. The original deed was also not produced, leading to an adverse inference against the defendant.

Since the essential element of payment of sale consideration was not proved, the Court held the sale deed was void ab initio. If the deed is void, there is no need to seek a prayer for its cancellation. Hence, the limitation period for suit to recover possession, when the sale is void, will be governed by Article 65 of the Limitation Act, the Court ruled.

"To put it simply, in the eyes of the law, the plaintiff could not be said to have executed the sale deed. Therefore, the plaintiff could indeed have maintained an action to obtain possession of the property on the basis of her title and filed the same within the period of 12 years from the date of knowledge that the possession of the defendant was adverse to that of the plaintiff," the Court said.

Cause Title: SHANTI DEVI (SINCE DECEASED) THROUGH LRS. GORAN VERSUS JAGAN DEVI & ORS.

Waqf Amendment Act 2025: Supreme Court Stays 5-Year Islam Practice Condition & Provision Derecognizing Waqf Property Till Govt Officers' Decision On Encroachment

 IN RE THE WAQF (AMENDMENT)w ACT, 2025 (1)|W.P.(C) No. 276/2025

The Supreme Court today stayed certain provisions of the Waqf (Amendment) Act 2025.

A bench comprising Chief Justice of India BR Gavai and Justice AG Masih interfered with the following provisions .

1. The provision in Section 3(1)(r) that a person should be a practitioner of Islam for 5 years to create a Waqf has been stayed till State Governments frame rules for providing mechanism to determine the question whether a person has been practising Islam for 5 years or more. Without such a mechanism, the privison will lead to an "arbitrary exercise of power," the Court observed.

2. The proviso to sub-section 2 of Section 3C, allowing the designated officer of the Government to decide the dispute whether a Waqf property has encroached upon a Government property has been stayed, observing that an Executive Officer cannot be permitted to adjudicate the rights of personal citizens and this will violate the separation of powers. However, till adjudication happens by the Tribunal, no third party rights can be created against any parties.

3. The provision allowing the nomination of non-Muslim members to the Waqf Boards has not been stayed. However, the Court observed that, as far as possible, the Ex-officio member of the Board, should be a Muslim person. The Court observed that for the Central Waqf Councul, it shall not consist of more than 4 non-muslim members, and for State Waqf Board, not more than 3 non-Muslim members.

The Court did not interfere with the provision mandating registration, saying that it is not a new requirement, as this condition was there in the previous enactments of 1995 and 2013 as well. However, the Court has extended the timelines for registration (which will be known once the judgment is uploaded.)

The Court had reserved the order on May 22 after hearing the parties over three days. The petitions are filed challenging the constitutionality of the sweeping changes made to the Waqf law by the amendments passed by the Parliament in 2025.

In April, after a bench led by former CJI Sanjiv Khanna expressed some prima facie reservations about some of the provisions, the Union undertook that non-Muslims would not be appointed to the State Waqf Boards and the Central Waqf Councils during the pendency of the matter. The Centre also agreed that no Waqf, including a Waqf by user, whether declared by way of notification or by way of registration, shall be de-notified, nor will their character or status be changed.

AIMIM MP Asaduddin Owaisi, Delhi AAP MLA Amanatullah Khan, Association for Protection of Civil Rights, Jamiat Ulema-i-Hind President Arshad Madani,Samastha Kerala Jamiatul Ulema, Anjum Kadari, Taiyyab Khan Salmani, Mohammad Shafi, TMC MP Mahua Moitra, Indian Union Muslim League, All India Muslim Personal Law Board, RJD MP Manoj Kumar Jha, SP MP Zia ur Rehman, Communist Party of India, DMK etc., are some of the petitioners.

Intervention applications have been filed by five BJP-led States: Assam, Rajasthan, Chhattisgarh, Uttarakhand, Haryana and Maharashtra, supporting the legislation. Recently, the State of Kerala has also filed an intervention supporting the 2025 Amendment.

Common provisions challenged in all petitions

Omission of 'waqf by user' provision, inclusion of non-Muslim members in the Central Waqf Council and State Waqf Board, pre-condition of 5 years as practising Muslim for create of waqf, allowing Government to decide disputes regarding encroachment of government property, application of Limitation Act to Waqf Act, invalidating Waqf created over ASI protected monuments, restrictions on creating Waqfs over scheduled areas, limiting the inclusion of women members to two in the Council and Boards, diluting waqf-alal-aulad, renaming 'Waqf Act, 1995 to "Unifed Waqf Management, Empowerment, Efficiency and Development," providing appeal against the Tribunal's order etc., are some of the provisons under challenge.