The Gujarat High Court has ruled that under Muslim law, when a couple mutually decides to dissolve their marriage i.e. Mubaraat, they are at liberty to do so through mutual verbal consent without drawing up a written agreement. For context, under Muslim law process of Mubaraat refers to divorce/dissolution of marriage through mutual consent between the husband and wife.
The Supreme Court on Thursday (August 14) expressed reluctance to entertain the petition filed by the National Highways Authority of India (NHAI) challenging thejudgment of the Kerala High Court which suspended the toll collection at the Paliyekkara toll plaza in Thrissur district along National Highway 544 due to the bad condition of the highway.
Both Chief Justice of India BR Gavai and Justice K Vinod Chandran, the members of the two-judge bench, said that they have personally experienced the bad condition of the road stretch.
Solicitor General of India Tushar Mehta said that the NHAI was primarily aggrieved with the High Court stating that the concessionaire can recover from the NHAI the losses it suffered due to the suspension of the toll collection. "My worry is they(concessionaire) will claim from me(NHAI), though it is their responsibility[to maintain the road]," SG said.
CJI Gavai said, "When the road is in such a bad condition... I had occasion to travel in it. You take the toll from the people and don't provide the services..."
"The service road is not being maintained. It is not the concessionaire's responsibility. That is the finding of the High Court"Justice Chandran said. SG replied that, as per the O&M contract, the liability is on the concessionaire.
The counsel for the concessionaire said that there were five blind spots identified by the authorities, which do not come within their scope of work. "I am maintaining the Highway as per the agreement," the counsel said.
SG pointed out that the concessionaire has also filed a Special Leave Petition which is not listed today. "We will dismiss both," CJI said. When the SG requested for a posting to Monday, CJI asked, "You want to postpone the dismissal?"
"We will clarify that if there is any dispute between the NHAI and the concessionaire, it be determined as per the law, whether arbitration or otherwise," CJI said.
In an attempt to persuade the bench, the SG explained :.
"There is a 65 kilometre road. The dispute is with respect to 2.85 kilometers. This a highway constructed by NHAI. There are intersections which are blind spots, where we have to make either underpasses or flyovers."
"You had to do it at the planning stage itself. Before completing the road, you start collecting the toll?" CJI remarked. SG said that the intersections came subsequent to the highway.
Justice Vinod Chandran however pointed out that the intersections specified by the NHAI, such as Muningoor, Amballoor, Perambra, Koratty, Chirangara etc., are quite far from the toll booth. Justice Chandran also referred to a Malayalam news report about the protest staged by a person after he could not attend his father-in-law's funeral due to the traffic block at the toll booth.
"The entire problem occurs because there is a big block there. There is a bottleneck. Often, even ambulances cannot pass. That is the problem. The High Court has only suspended for four weeks. Instead of filing appeal and wasting time, you do something," Justice Vinod Chandran said. SG assured that the work was under progress.
"Without completing the road, how can you start the toll? I also had the opportunity to travel by that road once," CJI Gavai said. "My learned brother also knows the area very well," CJI added.
SG said that the highway was constructed long back and the five intersections came subsequently. "There is no difficulty with the highway. The difficulty is with the intersections. To resolve the blindspots, we are constructing overbridges and underpasses at the intersections, which came subsequent to the Highway. For that purpose, we have constructed the service road. Because when work is going on, the highway cannot be used and service road has to be used. The congestion is in the service road. That is the issue," SG stated.
"The congestion in the blindspots in the intersection are quite distant from the toll area. They are obliged to do maintenance only with respect to the toll area. Not with respect to the service road," Justice Chandran said. SG then requested a posting on Monday to show the locations of work from the map.
The bench said that it was not prima facie inclined to entertain the challenge. The bench said that it will clarify that the inter-se dispute between the NHAI and the concessionaire can be resolved through arbitration. "We will leave issue open to be decided in arbitration between NHAI and the concessionaire. Arbitrators will be benefited, the lawyers will be benefited. Why should the citizens be put to unnecessary hardships?" CJI said.
CJI pointed out that the High Court has been prodding the authorities to resolve the issue since February and that the judgment was passed after there was no positive response.
Senior Advocate Shyam Divan, for the concessionaire Guruvayoor Infrastructure Ltd, said that they have also filed a petition challenging the High Court's judgment and requested that it be posted on Monday. The matter was ultimately posted to Monday.
Senior Advocate Jayant Muthuraj represented the petitioners who were in the High Court.
By the judgment dated August 6, a division bench of the Kerala High Court ordered the suspension of toll collection for four weeks on the ground that the Edapally-Mannuthy stretch was badly maintained and was facing severe traffic congestion due to the delay in the execution of works.
The Court observed that toll fees cannot be collected from the public when access to highway is hindered due to ill-maintained roads and consequent traffic congestion.
"It is to be remembered that the public is obliged to pay the user fees at the toll for using the highway. It casts responsibility on the National Highways Authority to ensure smooth traffic without any barrier created by the NHAI or by its agents, who are the concessionaires. This relationship between the Public and the NHAI is bound by the tie of public trust. The moment it is breached or violated, the right to collect toll fees from the public created through statutory provisions cannot be forced on the public," the High Court observed.
Case Details : NATIONAL HIGHWAY AUTHORITY OF INDIA AND ANR. Versus O.J JANEESH AND ORS| SLP(C) No. 22579/2025
The Supreme Court
A bench comprising Chief Justice of India BR Gavai and Justice MM Sundresh dismissed the review petition in chamber observing, "we do not find any justifiable reason to entertain the review petition."
The Ritu Chhabaria judgment was delivered on April 26, 2023, by a bench comprising Justice Krishna Murari and Justice CT Ravikumar (both of them retired now) holding that "if the Investigating Agency files a chargesheet without completing the investigation, the same would not extinguish the right of the accused to get default bail."
It may be noted that the operation of the Ritu Chhabaria judgment has been in effect suspended by virtue of another order passed by the Supreme Court in a Special Leave Petition filed by the Enforcement Directorate (SLP(Crl) No. 005724 - / 2023). On May 1, 2023, a bench comprising the then Chief Justice of India DY Chandrachud and Justice Pardiwala ordered that applications seeking default bail on the basis of the Ritu Chhabaria judgment should be deferred by the Court. This order was passed after Solicitor General of India Tushar Mehta submitted that the investigating agencies are facing difficulties due to the judgment. The said SLP of the ED is still pending, which means that the operation of the Ritu Chhabaria judgment continues to be in abeyance, despite the dismissal of the review petition.
Case : CENTRAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION THROUGH SUPERINTENDENT v. RITU CHHABARIA & ORS | R.P. (CRL.) NO. 124/2025 IN W.P. (CRL.) NO. 60/2023
In a strong rebuke to the functioning of a sitting judge of the Allahabad High Court, the Supreme Court of India on Monday made scathing remarks while hearing a Special Leave Petition (SLP) challenging an order that allowed the continuation of criminal proceedings in a matter the apex court found to be clearly civil in nature.
The SLP was filed against the judgment dated May 5, 2025, in Application U/S 482 No. 2507 of 2024, in which the High Court had permitted the complainant to proceed with criminal litigation despite acknowledging that the underlying dispute involved financial recovery—a domain typically handled through civil proceedings.
A Bench comprising Justice J.B. Pardiwala and Justice R. Mahadevan, while hearing the matter in open court, set aside the Allahabad High Court’s decision and issued a damning critique of the reasoning adopted by the concerned judge.
The Supreme Court expressed grave concern over Paragraph 12 of the impugned High Court judgment, where the judge had reasoned that referring the complainant to a civil court for recovery would be unfair, as it would require additional financial investment and prolonged litigation. The High Court judge had remarked:
“In case, O.P. no.2 files a civil suit, firstly, it will take years for it to see any ray of hope and secondly, he will have to put more money to pursue the litigation. To be more precise, it would seem like good money chasing bad money… If this Court allows the matter to be referred to civil court… it would amount to travesty of justice.”
The apex court took serious exception to this line of reasoning. Justice Pardiwala observed:
“The judge has gone to the extent of saying that asking the complainant to pursue civil remedy for the purpose of recovery of his balance amount will be very unreasonable… Is it the understanding of the High Court judge that even ultimately, rightly or wrongly, if the accused is convicted, the trial court will award him the balance amount? The findings recorded in para 12 are shocking.”
The Supreme Court passed the following Order in Open Court:
“The judge has gone to the extent of saying that asking the complainant to pursue civil remedy for the purpose of recovery of his balance amount will be very unreasonable as civil suit may take a long time before it is decided and therefore, the complainant should be permitted to institute criminal proceedings for the purpose of recovery of the balance amount. Is it the understanding of the High Court judge that even ultimately rightly or wrongly if the accused is convicted, the trial court will award him the balance amount?
The findings recorded in para 12 are shocking. We are left with no other option but to set aside this order even without issuing notice to the respondents.
In the result, we partly allow this petition and set aside the impugned order passed by the High Court. We remand the matter to the High Court for fresh consideration of the Criminal Miscellaneous Application Number 2507 of 2024.
We request the Honourable Chief Justice of the High Court to assign this matter to any other judge of the High Court. We further request the Honourable Chief Justice to immediately withdraw the present determination of the concerned judge.
The concerned judge should be made to sit in a division bench with a senior, with a, with a seasoned senior judge of the High Court. In any view of the matter, the concerned judge shall not be assigned any criminal determination till he demits office. If at all at some point of time he is to be made to sit as a single judge, he shall not be assigned any criminal determination. Registry to forward one copy of this order to Honourable the Chief Justice of Allahabad High Court at the earliest.”
Finding the observations untenable in law and jurisprudentially flawed, the Supreme Court declared that it had no choice but to set aside the High Court order “even without issuing notice to the respondents.”
The bench directed that the matter be reconsidered afresh and passed the following operative directions:
The Supreme Court has held that in cases of conviction under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, the sentencing must be accompanied by a fine sufficient to cover the cheque amount, along with applicable interest and compensation. A bench of Justice B.V. Nagarathna and Justice K.V. Viswanathan dismissed the appeal filed by the accused, Mohammad Ali, and upheld his conviction by the Karnataka High Court.
Case Background
Mohammad Ali was prosecuted by Sharanappa in Criminal Case No. 2378 of 2013 before the I Additional Civil Judge and JMFC, Vijayapur, for dishonour of a cheque worth ₹10,00,000. The trial court acquitted the accused on January 6, 2017. This acquittal was challenged by the complainant before the High Court of Karnataka at Kalaburagi Bench.
On October 9, 2023, the High Court allowed the appeal and convicted Mohammad Ali under Section 138 of the NI Act. It imposed a fine of ₹10,10,000, of which ₹10,00,000 was directed to be paid to the complainant as compensation under Section 357(1)(b) of the CrPC, and ₹10,000 was to be remitted to the State. In case of default, the accused was ordered to undergo simple imprisonment for six months.
The bench rejected both grounds raised by the appellant.
On the first issue, the Court observed:
“Even in the absence of any rebuttal evidence, the appellant cannot contend that there was an absence of foundational facts or that the very raising of a presumption under Section 118 read with Section 139 of the Act in favour of the respondent was incorrect.”
The Court held that the complainant had successfully established foundational facts, and in the absence of rebuttal evidence from the accused, the High Court was justified in raising the statutory presumptions and convicting him.
On the second issue regarding compensation, the Court referred to its earlier judgment in R. Vijayan v. Baby, (2012) 1 SCC 260, and noted:
“Section 138 of the Act authorises the learned Magistrate to impose by way of fine an amount which may extend to twice the amount of cheque, with or without imprisonment. In all such cases, where there is a conviction, there should be a consequential levy of fine of an amount sufficient to cover the cheque amount. There could also be interest on the cheque amount, followed by award of such amount as compensation from the fine amount.”
The Court clarified that the High Court had imposed a fine of ₹10,10,000, from which ₹10,00,000 was to be paid to the complainant as compensation. The additional ₹10,000 was to be remitted to the State. There was no separate or additional award of compensation beyond the fine.
“We do not think that the appellant has been directed to pay a fine of ₹10,10,000 and an additional amount of ₹10,00,000 towards compensation. Thus, in fact, the respondent has not been paid any amount by way of compensation at all. He is ordered to be entitled to cheque amount of ₹10,00,000 and no further amount.”
Order
The Supreme Court refused to interfere with the conviction or the sentence. However, upon request by the appellant’s counsel, the Court granted three months’ time from the date of judgment to deposit the fine amount. The cheque amount was to be paid to the complainant upon deposit, failing which the appellant would serve the default sentence of six months’ simple imprisonment.
The appeal was disposed of accordingly.
NMM vs State of Maharashtra (Criminal Application 1619 of1923
A male friend of the husband is not his relative and thus cannot be booked under section 498A of the Indian Penal Code (IPC), held the Nagpur bench of the Bombay High Court recently, while quashing a First Information Report (FIR) lodged against a man booked under the said offence.
A division of Justices Anil Pansare and Mahendra Nerlikar noted that one of the applicants before it was the husband's friend, who was named by the complainant wife in her FIR against her husband and his parents.
The judges referred to the ruling of the Supreme Court in which the top court had held that a girlfriend or even a woman with whom a man has had romantic or sexual relations outside of marriage court not be construed to be a relative. The judges noted that the word 'relative' brings within its purview a 'status' which is conferred either by “blood or marriage or adoption.”
"Therefore, we have no hesitation in observing that the same analogy would be applied while interpreting the term 'relative' defined under Section 498-A of the IPC in respect of a 'friend.' A friend cannot be said to be a relative as he is neither a blood relative nor he was having any relation through marriage or adoption. Therefore, considering these facts and upon plain reading of Section 498-A of the IPC, we come to the conclusion that a friend of husband will not fall under the definition of 'relative' of the husband as contemplated under Section 498-A of the IPC," the judges held in the order passed on July 29.
According to the FIR filed by the woman on June 13, 2022, the friend of her husband often visited their matrimonial house and instigated the husband to demand a car and a plot from the wife's parents. The friend was further accused of insisting the husband not to cohabit with the complainant wife on her failure to fulfil the demand. The friend was also accused of instigating the husband to drive the wife out of her matrimonial house for failing to meet the demands.
However, the bench noted that since the applicant is a friend and does not qualify the status of a 'relative' of the husband, he cannot be made to face trial under section 498A and therefore, quashed the FIR and also the chargesheet filed against him by the Chandrapur Police.
